ICAO and
regulators worldwide are examining methods to mitigate the risk posed by air
carriage of lithium batteries. The crashes of two freighters in 2010 and 2011,
and the grounding of Boeing 787s in 2013, all connected with lithium batteries on
board, in combination with recent FAA studies, have sparked an intense debate
on the conditions under which lithium batteries should be (not) allowed on board
aircraft.
On 3 September
2010, UPS
flight 6 from Dubai to Cologne-Bonn airport developed an in-flight fire.
The pilots reported that the aircraft, a Boeing 747-44AF, including the cockpit
was full of smoke. A diversion of the flight for emergency landing in Dubai was
attempted, yet the aircraft crashed about 30 minutes later. The accident
investigation report concluded that the fire that caused the crash began from autoignition
of
the contents of a cargo pallet, which contained lithium batteries and other
combustible materials.
On 28 July 2011 Asiana
cargo flight 991 from Seoul to Shanghai crashed into the ocean shortly
after the crew reported a fire in the cargo compartment and attempted to divert
the fight for an emergency landing. The aircraft, a Boeing 747-48EF freighter,
was carrying also lithium-ion batteries and flammable liquids, from which a
fire developed, which caused the accident.
In 2013, all
Boeing 787 worldwide were temporarily grounded after two incidents involving
fire during the flight were connected to the aircraft’s two lithium-ion
batteries.
Tests
conducted by the FAA in 2014 and 2015 showed that ignition of unburned
flammable gases associated with a lithium-battery fire may lead to a
catastrophic explosion, which could not be prevented by current fire suppression
systems on board cargo compartments of aircraft. In addition, tests also
revealed that the ignition of a mixture of flammable gases could produce an over-pressure, which could result in the leakage of smoke and gases from the
cargo department into the occupied areas of the aircraft. The number of cells
necessary to produce this condition is small and can occur with just a few
packages. In general, the carriage of
lithium cells and
batteries in aircraft
cargo compartments presents
three distinct hazards: (1) they can cause fire, (2) they can fuel an
existing fire, (3) they can produce an explosive mixture of gas.
Airbus
and Boeing
have recommended that operators conduct safety risk assessments before deciding
to transport lithium batteries as cargo.
The European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) has
recommended that operators, before engaging in the transport of lithium
batteries/cells as cargo in passenger or freighter aircraft, conduct a safety
risk assessment in order to establish whether the risk is manageable. The US Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) supports
these recommendations and encourages operators who have previously
performed a risk assessment to reevaluate their assessment in light of the further
evidence gained through the recent testing of lithium batteries. The US National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued two
safety recommendations: to physically separate lithium batteries from other
flammable hazardous materials stowed on cargo aircraft and to establish maximum
loading density requirements that restrict the quantities of lithium batteries
and flammable hazardous materials.
The Air
Navigation Commission (ANC) of the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) recommended in January 2016 that lithium-ion batteries be forbidden for
carriage as cargo on passenger aircraft. The recommendation does not apply to
lithium-ion batteries packed with equipment or lithium-ion batteries contained
in equipment. The ANC recommendation will be considered by the ICAO Council in late
February this year as an amendment of Annex 18. It is expected that the ICAO
Council will endorse ANC’s recommendations and the prohibition will start as of
1 April 2016. As to cargo aircraft, the
ICAO Council has already banned carriage of lithium batteries charged more than
30%, effective as of 1 April 2016. See also the IATA
briefing in this regard.
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